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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
tendering as they did in depreciated notes not equal in value to
the currency when the contract was made, unless making an
allowance for that depreciation. But without giving any positive
opinion upon that point, I think, for the reasons previously stated,
that the tender was not in accordance with the contract, there-
fore not a, legal one, and that judgment should be entered for
the plaintiffs for the amount of their claim, payable in the me-
tallic dollar and cent of the United States currency, or that which
is equivalent thereto, with interest from the 15th November,
1862, and 15th day of May, 1863, upon the respective sums due
at those dates, according to the terms of the lease, with costs of
suit.
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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.'
SUPREME COURT OF VERMIONT. 2
AGREEMENT.
Ezxecution-Rlevin.-An agreement was made between B. and D.,
by which B. was to furnish the money to purchase, in his name, 15,000
or 20,000 feet of oak timber, the same to be selected in the woods,
standing, by D., and to be cut, hewn, rafted, and delivered by him to
B., at Troy, for which he was to receive 10J cents per cubic foot. Held,
that B. had the general property in timber got out under this contract,
and which D. was engaged in transporting to Troy; but that he had no
rigrht to the possession thereof. That as between B. and D., the latter
had a special property in the timber, accompanied by the right of pos-
session, and that D.'s interest was the subject of levy and sale under
execution against him: Weaver vs. Darby, 42 Barb.
Beld, also, that to an action of replevin, brought against D. by the
purchaser at a sale under execution, proof of a general property in B.
at the time of the levy, was not a good defence : Id.
That the plaintiff in such suit was entitled to recover, he having the
right of possession, as against D., and the right of property, united. But
that as the title he had acquired was a mere special property, he was
only entitled to a verdict finding the property in him, and to an assess-
ment of the value of the timber at the amount of the value of A's spe-
cial property therein, viz. : 10J cents per cubic foot, deducting there-
from the expense of transporting the timber to Troy: Id.
'From Hon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in vol. 42 of his Reports.
2For these abstracts we are indebted to the courtesy of Chief Justice POLAND.
The cases were decided at the General Term of November, 1864, and the volume
of Reports in which they will appear cannot yet be indicated.
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CERTIORARI.
Parties to-usband and Wife.-If a husband is in fact the tenant
of premises, and has been removed from the possession by summary pro-
ceedings under the statute, for the non-payment of rent, without due
notice, he alone is entitled to judgment of restitution ; and he alone
should be the relator in a certiorari to review the proceedings and judg-
ment. The court cannot order restitution in favor of the wife, or other
person not a party to the proceedings: The People ex rel. Lawson vs.
M( Cuff -ey, 42 Barb.
DOWER.
llortgage-Foreclosure.-W here S., previous to his marriage, mort-
gaged certain property to secure the payment of the purchase-money, a
portion of the mortgage-money being agreed to be paid to extinguish a
prior mortgage on the premises; and upon a foreclosure of the first
mortgage, in chancery, the premises were sold by a master and conveyed
to a purchaser, from whom the defendant derived title thereto; Held, that
the circumstance that the wife of S. was not made a party to the foreclosure
suit was not sufficient to enable her to maintain ejectment for her dower;
her remedy, if any, being by an action to redeem: Smith vs. Gardner,
42 Barb.
If tlhe mortgagee enters under a foreclosure, or after forfeiture of the
estate, and by virtue of his rights as mortgagee, the right of dower of
the mortgagor's wife must yield to the mortgagee's superior title; for,
as against the title under the mortgage, the widow has no right of dower,
and the equity of redemption is entirely subordinate to that title: id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Sales to Wife by tusband.-A married woman, claiming the benefit
of our statutes, passed in 1848 and 1849, for the more effectual protec-
tion of the property of married women, must show that she was a resi-
dent of this state, at a time and under circumstances to entitle her to
such benefit: Savage vs. O'Niel, 42 Barb.
A person coming to this state, from a foreign country, six years ago,
and who has since resided here, is entitled to the full benefit of all our
local statutes governing the rights of citizens: Id.
The Acts of 1848 and 1849 did not, and could not, take away the
right of a husband, married in 1847, in his wife's personal property and
choses in action: Id.
The disability of coverture, which existed at common law, precluding
husband and wife from contracting with each other, was not taken away
by those statutes, but still exists : Id.
It was impossible at common law, and still is, for husband and wife
to make any valid contract with each other. And the rule in respect to
all grants, conveyances, gifts, or transfers from husband to wife remains
as it was at common law. All such transfers of real or personal pro-
perty are absolutely void: Id.
Accordingly held, that a pretended sale, by a husband to his wife, of
a stock of goods in a store, being null and void, passed no title to the
wife, but the property remained his, and might lawfully be levied on by
his creditors, upon execution: .1d.
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3MORTGAGE.
Title under.-While a mortgage is, in equity, a mere lien, it is still
such a lien that on a foreclosure it ripens into a title, extinguishing that
of the mortgagor. And this not only in favor of the mortgagee, but
also of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, and of all persons after-
wards claiming under him: Smith vs. Gardner, 42 Barb.
If the mortgagee enters under a foreclosure, he is in under his mort-
gage : Id.
The interest remaining in the mortgagor is an equity, which the fore-
closure cuts off; leaving the title conveyed by the mortgage abso-
lute : Id.
PLEADING.
Separate Counts.-It is a fundamental rule, in pleading, that where
there are separate counts in a complaint, each must disclose a distinct
right of action: Simmons vs. Fairchild, 42 Barb.
Another rule is that the complaint should consist of allegations or
averments of fact stated positively, or upon information and belief: i.
PRINCIPAL, AND AGENT.
Express Companies-Their Liability as Common Carriers of .Money.
-The plaintiffs, bankers in the country, sent by express, to the defend-
ant, a bank in the city of New York, a sealed package of bank notes.
directed to its cashier. The package was delivered by the express com-
pany, at the bank, to S., the assistant receiving-teller, while he was at
the receiving-teller's desk, during the temporary absence of the latter
therefrom, S. giving a receipt therefor. Held, that the bank, by plac-
iag S. behind the railing, and permitting him to act there as assistant
zvoeiving-teller, held him out to the express agent as authorized to receive
the package, at least for the purpose of delivering it to the cashier; and
that upon the-money failing to come to the hands of the cashier, or into
the po Session of the bank, the loss must fall upon the bank, instead of
the express company: Botchkiss vs. The Artisan's Bank, 42 Barb.
RAILROAD.
Negligence-Blowing the Whistle.-Under a statute requiring a bell
to be rung or a steam whistle blown on every locomotive engine, at least
eighty rods from the place where the railroad crosses a highway or street,
on the same grade, and continued until the engine shall have passed
such crossing, and imposing a penalty upon the corporation for unrea-
sonably neglecting or refusing thus to ring the bell or blow the whistle;
in an action on the case for an injury alleged to have been caused to the
plaintiff's horses and person, by reason of an omission to ring the bell
or blow the whistle as prescribed by the statute; it was held, that the
duty thus imposed was not confined to persons approaching, or in the
act of passing such crossing, but existed in favor of all persons, who,
being lawfully at or in the vicinity of such crossing, may be subjected
to accident or injury in person or property by the passing of the train
over such crossing. Reld, also, that while the statute was not designed
to subject the corporation to civil liability in every case of injury caused,
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or contributed to, by the omission to ring the bell or blow the whistle,
irrespective of the character and circumstances of the given case, still it
imposed upon the corporation the burden of showing that such omission
was prudent and reasonable, in the exercise of sound discretion and
judgment by the engineer, in view of the existing condition of things
at the time of, and inducing such omission; and this is to be determined
by the jury upon all the evidence in the case bearing upon the subject:
Vakefield vs. Con. and Pts. River Railroad Co., Sup. Ot., Vt.
SECURITY.
Absolute Deed by Way of Securify-Agreement-Equitable Defence-
Statute of Frauds.-Where land is conveyed by an absolute deed, as
security for money due. loaned, or advanced, the title of the grantee is
that of a mere mortgagee: iJlcBurney vs. Wellman, 42 Barb.
11. being in possession of land, under a contract with H. for the pur-
chase thereof, applied to M. to advance for him the unpaid purchase-
money due to I. 3. accordingly advanced that amount, at the same time
agreeing to give W. five years in which to repay it, to take a conVeyance
of the land from I. for his security, and to give W. a written contract to
that effect. The land was thereupon conveyed to M. by an absolute
deed. field, that this was an application and an agreement for a loan
for five years on the security of the land, and that M. must be deemed
to have taken the title, as between him and W., as a mere security for
the sum advanced to W., to pay the balance due to H. on the contract,
and as a trustee of the title: Id.
Held, also, that if TH.'s title was that of a mortgagee, he could not
maintain ejectment against W.; and that although it is inadmissible at
law to show by parol that a deed absolute on its face was intended to be,
and is, a mere mortgage, yet that such a defence was always admissible
in equity; and an equitable defence may now be made in a legal action,
and is equally available as a legal defence: -d.
feld, further, that it would be a great perversion of the Statute of
Frauds to hold, that the fraud of M. in getting the title to the land in
himself, and then refusing to give W. the written conveyance he had
promised, should deprive W. of the right to show, as a defence to an
action of ejectment, what the real transaction was, and to have the
appropriate redress: 1d.
SHERIFF'S DEED.
Bonafide Pirchasers.-Although a sheriff, who sells real estate upon
execution, cannot execute a conveyance to the purchaser until after the
expiration of fifteen months from the time of the sale, yet his convey-
ance, when made, is valid and effectual to convey all the right, title, and
interest, which was sold by him. And however long after the time to
redeem expires, it is executed, it relates back, so as to convey all such
right, title, and interest: Reynold's Administrators vs. Darling, 42 Barb.
How far these general rules are subject to qualification when the
rights of third persons intervene : Id.
In case the purchaser dies previous to the execution and delivery of
the deed by the sherif, the same must be executed and delivered to the
executors or administrators of the purchaser, who will hold the real estate
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so conveyed in trust for the use of the heirs, and may maintain eject-
meat to recover the possession without joining the heirs with them: Id.
A sheriff's deed to the administrator of a deceased purchaser will con-
vey to the grantee all the right, title, and interest in the land which the
sheriff sold, unless some third person has acquired rights which prevent
the deed having that effect: Id.
A purchaser of real estate from a judgment-debtor, more than ten
years after the docketing of a judgment against him, is to be deemed a
purchaser in good faith, unless he purchases with an actual fraudulent
intent. Mere notice of the judgment, either actual or constructive, will
not render the purchase maldfide: Id.
STATUTE Or FRAUDS.
Contract for Purc7tase of Land-Parol Guaranty of Quantity.-The
defendant's father, owning a large and valuable real estate, told the
defendant that if he could sell a certain portion of said property for
$8000, to be paid to the father, he (the father) would let the defendant
have the rest of his property for a certain sum, less by $2000 than its
just value. In pursuance of said arrangement, the plaintiff bargained,
by parol, with the defendant for the purchase of such portion of said
property, consisting of two parcels and the right to a spring of water, for
the sum of $8000, to be paid to the father; the defendant guaranteeing
that one of said parcels contained one hundred and ninety-six acres. On
a subsequent day fixed by plaintiff and defendant, they and the father
met, and the father, by a proper deed in common form, conveyed to plain-
tiff the bargained property by description merely,' and not by quantity,
and the plaintiff made payment and security to the father of said 6800C,
and took possession of the property, and has ever since held it, making
payments on time notes given for part of said sum as they fell due. The
father conveyed the residue of his estate to the defendant, agreeably to
the understanding between them. Some time after said conveyance to
the plaintiff, he ascertained that said parcel contained about one hundred
and seventy-three acres instead of one hundred and ninety-six, and
thereupon brought this suit in assumpsit in a special count on the con-
tract of guaranty, and in the common money counts, to recover the value
of such deficiency : ZTeld, that the contract of guaranty, being part of
the contract for the sale of land for an aggregate and indivisible con-
sideration, was within the Statute of Frauds, and, being by parol, could
not be enforced by action: Dyer vs. Graves, Sup. Ct., Vt.
VOLUNTARY SERVICES.
lmplied Promise to pay for Damages in conseguence of a Flood.-
Common justice requires that where one has incurred necessary expense,
or suffered damage in securing, or caring for, or storing the property of
another which is lost, afloat, or estray, and it is afterwards reclaimed, the
owner sJaould repay such expense, or pay such damhge, and if refused
that an action to recover therefor should be sustained. In such a case
the law should imply a request, and a promise from the owner: Sheldon
vs. Sherman et al., 42 Barb.
The defendants having a large number of saw-logs, secured by a boom.
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in the Rucison river, a public way for floating logs and rafts, an unusual
freshet occurred, whereby said logs were carried away, floated down the
river, and lodged upon the meadow lands of the plaintiff, where they
remained several months, when they were taken away by the owners.
The logs passed the boom, floated down the river, and lodged on the
plaintiff's land, without any omission, negligence, fault, or wrongful act
of the defendants; but the plaintiff sustained damage by reason of their
remaining on his land. Hebl, that although a promise could not be im-
plied to pay, nor a recovery had, for the damages occasioned by the mere
lodayneitt of the logs on the plaintiff's premises, yet that for the damages
caused by .uj'eriny them to remain there for an unreasonable length of
time, when they were reclaimed, a promise to pay could be implied, and
a recovery had thereon : Id.
WILL.
Execution- in the presence of Witnesses.-The statute of Vermont
requires all wills to be " in writing, and signed by the testator, or by
some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses, in the pre-
sence of the testator, and of each other." The testator's will having
been written and read to him, he signed the same. Two witnesses were
present in the room and saw the testator sign, and thereupon they signed
the will as witnesses, in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The person named as executor in the will was also present, and it had
been intended by the scrivener that he should be the other witness; but
a doubt beidg suggested as to his competency as a witness, another per-
son was sent for, who came into the room, whereupon the testator
acknowledged his signature to the will, and the two witnesses who had
signed, acknowledged their signatures, and the third witness then, in
the presence of the testator and the other two witnesses, wrote his name
as a witness to the will. The County Court, POLAND, Ch. J., presiding,
held the will well executed. On exceptions to this decision it was held
that the judgment was erroneous, and that said will was not legally
executed: Jlei's of Pope vs. Ex'rs of -Pope.1
I The foregoing case, decided at the same term with the case of Warner, App.,
vs. Warner's Estate, reported in our present number, seems to have proceeded
upon somewhat opposite grounds; the one carrying a merely formal require-
ment, which had been already practically dispensed with as to the signature of
the testator, into an almost incomprebenbible degree of nicety of legal refine-
ment, so as to admit of no legal equivalent, however exact and perfect, and the
other extending the construction of a familiar and unequivocal word so as to
include almost every kind of revocation under that of " cancelling." We con-
fess to some admiration of the abstract equity of the particular decision in War-
ner rs. Warner; but we cannot help feeling that the above case might have been
affirmed without. any departure from the soundest rules of construction, and thus
have vindicated the consistency of the law, and at the same time not have vio-
lated the justice of the particular case. I. F. R.
